Abstract-In recent years, privacy protection has become an important topic when cooperative computation is performed in distributed environments. This paper puts forward efficient protocols for computing the multi-dimensional aggregates in distributed environments while keeping privacy preserving. We propose a novel model, which contains two crucial stages: local computation and cooperative computation based on secure multiparty computation protocols for privacy-preserving on-line analytical processing. According to the new model, we develop approaches to privacy-preserving count aggregate query over both horizontally partitioned data and vertically partitioned data. We, meanwhile, propose an efficient sub-protocol Two-Round Secure Sum Protocol. Theoretical analysis indicates that our solutions are secure and the answers are exactly accurate, that is, they can securely obtain the exact answer to aggregate query without revealing anything about their confidential data to each other. We also analyze detailedly the communication cost and computation complexity of our schemes in the paper and it shows that the new solutions have good linear complexity. No privacy loss and exact accuracy are two main significant advantages of our new schemes.
INTRODUCTION
On-line analytical processing (denoted as OLAP) is a significant data analysis technology. In recent years, OLAP encounters a new problem that it is now required to developed methods to protect the confidential information of individuals when the computation of multi-dimensional aggregates is performed in distributed environments. Privacy preserving OLAP (denoted as PPOLAP) devotes to designing secure distributed OLAP model and developing privacy protection approaches to concrete aggregate query. Agrawal et al. [1] first propose the problem of PPOLAP in a distributed scene and define a model for privacy-preserving computation of multidimensional count aggregates over data partitioned across multiple clients using the randomization approach. However, the model is not practical, because that its process was extremely complex and the scheme [1] is only able to return the inaccurate answers. Thus, more efficient methods should be developed for the special problems of PPOLAP.
The purpose of Secure Multi-party Computation (denoted as SMC) [2] [3] is to allow a group of participants to carry out cooperative computations over their private inputs in a special way that each participant knows the multi-party cooperative computations' result, but nobody learns more other than what could be derived from his outputs of the cooperative computations. Yao [2] introduces the notion of SMC in 1982. Since then, it has been a hot research topic and attracts numerous researchers [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . Basic SMC protocols can be used to construct far more complicated privacy preserving protocols to solve special practical questions, including privacy preserving data mining [14] [15] , privacy preserving social networks [16] , privacy-preserving computation geometry [7] [8] , etc.
In this paper, we investigate how to achieve PPOLAP using the methods of SMC and propose a novel model for aggregate queries over distributed data in privacy-preserving manner. Based on homomorphous encryption system [17] and scalar product protocol [4] [5] [6] , we propose two efficient schemes for PPOLAP following the new model, which are respectively application in two kinds of different distributed data structure, horizontally partitioned data and vertically partitioned data. Furthermore, we derive theoretical formulas to analyze the security and performance of the two schemes. It shows that our privacy preserving solutions are secure and the communication overheads and computation cost are reasonable. Another significant advantage of the new schemes is that they will return the accurate result to aggregate query instead of its maximum likelihood estimator which is the answer in Agrawal's model [1] .
Our main contributions in this paper are:
(1) We define a model for privacy-preserving computation of multidimensional count aggregates based on SMC;
(2) We propose a novel secure sum protocol: Two-Round Secure Sum Protocol (denoted as TSSP), which is quite secure to against underlying collusion; (3) We present two efficient schemes for PPOLAP following the new model, which are respectively application in two kinds of different distributed data structure, horizontally partitioned data and vertically partitioned data, and we detailedly analyze the security and performance of the two new schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some related work and give necessary preliminaries. The privacy preserving count aggregate query scheme on horizontally partitioned data and Two-Round Secure Sum Protocol are presented in section 3. Section 4 proposes a privacy preserving solution to count aggregate query on vertically partitioned data. We conclude our work and present directions for future research in section 5.
II. RELATED WORK AND PRELIMINARIES
The related work and some essential preliminaries are introduced in the following content.
A. Privacy preserving OLAP
Agrawal et al. [1] first propose the problem of PPOLAP in a distributed scene and define a model for privacy preserving computation of multidimensional count aggregate query on data partitioned across multiple clients using the randomization approach, where each client contributes perturbed private data to a central server, and then the server evaluates the answers to initial aggregate queries on global tables against perturbed tables by reconstructing original distributions. However, the model in [1] using randomization approach has some drawbacks. The following are several of them:
(1) It can't return the accurate result to aggregate query but just obtains a maximum likelihood estimator of the exact value. (2) The reconstruction is extremely complex and executes many matrix manipulations which are expensive in computation overhead. (3) The randomization approach only ensures low-lever privacy [1] . (4) Some private data of the clients will be revealed even though other party doesn't know which parts are genuine and which are fictitious. (5) There is a central server in the model, and all clients send perturbed data to the server; as a result, the server may become a bottle-neck and confidential information of clients will suffer huge leakage when a malicious attacker gains access to the server. (6) Since each client transports their perturbed data to the central server, the amount of communication between server and clients is great large. For the reasons above, Agrawal's model [1] is not suitable for practical applications. More efficient methods should be developed for the problems of PPOLAP.
We investigate PPOLAP and propose a new-type model (displayed in Figure 1 ) using SMC protocols to facilitate it. In our new model, each aggregate query on global data is broken down into some secondary queries for every client; a client performs local computation on his private sub-database. The results of local computation will act as the private inputs of SMC protocols to compute accurate answer to original global aggregate query in privacy-preserving and cooperative way. At last, SMC protocols securely output the exact answer to primordial aggregate query on global data.
According to the model in Figure 1 , we propose two approaches to response the privacy-preserving problems in OLAP, which respectively have application in different distributed data structures. We put forward privacy preserving solution to count aggregate query on horizontally partitioned data in section 3; communication overheads and computation complexity of each client in our schemes is O (1) O(n) where n n denotes the size of global database records. Theoretical analysis gives sufficient evidence of security and correctness of our schemes. 
B. Homomorphic Encryption
A public key encryption scheme (E; D) (E; D), where E E and D D are polynomial-time algorithms for encryption and decryption respectively, is homomorphic when it meets the following condition
That is
, where $ $ denotes that they hide the same plaintext item. As a result, we can employ homomorphic cryptosystem to compute
E(x) and E(y) E(y) such that the secret numbers x x and y y aren't disclosed. Pallier [17] proposed a semantically secure (IND-CPA secure) homomorphic encryption system. Another significant feature of Pallier's homomorphic encryption system is that it doesn't encrypt a plaintext unit into a same ciphertext item everytime. If E E is the encryption function which has two inputs a secret message m m and a random parameter r r, for an arbitrary secret message m m, we have E(m; r 1 ) 6 = E(m; r 2 ) (r 1 6 = r 2 ) E(m; r 1 ) 6 = E(m; r 2 ) (r 1 6 = r 2 ). However, the decryption doesn't depend on the random parameter at all and D(E(m; r 1 ))´D(E(m; r 2 ))´m D(E(m; r 1 ))´D(E(m; r 2 ))´m where D D is the corresponding decrypt function. The encryption scheme that satisfies the above property is called a probabilistic encryption scheme which was first introduced in [18] . We briefly describe Pallier's cryptosystem as follows. See [17] for more details.
Key generation: Select two large enough primes p p and. Then the secret private key sk sk is
The public key pk pk is (n; g) (n; g) , where n = pq n = pq and g 2 Z
L(x) = (x ¡ 1)=n and the same below. Encryption: Let m 2 Z n m 2 Z n be the plaintext. Select a random number r 2 Z n r 2 Z n as the secret parameter for probabilistic encryption. Then the cryptograph c c of
The homomorphic encryption system tersely described above is an important tool to be employed in our latter work. 
C. Scalar Product Protocol
Given two vectors a = (a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ) a = (a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ) and
. Scalar product protocol has been proposed in [4] [5] [6] . When Alice has the vector a a in private and Bob owns the other secret vector b b, the objective of scalar product protocol is to securely compute the inner product of two private vectors held by them. That is to say, scalar product protocol permit them to obtain the dot product of their private vectors such that neither party learns anything about partner's secret data apart from what is inferred from the scalar product and his own vector. At the end of scalar product protocol, Alice gets her secret output u u and Bob obtains the private number v v, which meet the equation
Scalar product protocol is one of significant members in SMC toolkit, and lots of problems can essentially be reduced to computing scalar product [4] [5] [6] 19] . While a a and b b are binary vectors (namely a i ; b i 2 f0; 1g; i = 1; 2; :::; n a i ; b i 2 f0; 1g; i = 1; 2; :::; n ), we call scalar product protocol that privately computes a ¢ b a ¢ b as binary scalar product protocol. R. N. Wright and Z. Yang [5] has presented an efficient secure binary scalar product protocol based on homomorphic encryption. In section 4, we will make use of binary scalar product protocol [5] , which is illustrated in Figure 2 , to privately evaluate count aggregate query on heterogeneous data.
D. Security Definition
Many SMC protocols [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] are under the semi-honest model. In the paper, we assume that all participants are semi-honest [3] , which is also called honest-but-curious, who exactly follow the steps of the protocols and keep a record of all the intermediate results he receives to infer some potentially confidential information contained in them. The formal security definition in the semi-honest model has been presented in [3] . Generally speaking, a SMC protocol is secure if and only if all the data that each participant has or receives during an execution could be deduced from his private input and confidential output. In fact, our approach over horizontally distributed data is stronger than the semi-honest model in some sense (see section 3). 
In this section, we describe how to securely evaluate count aggregate query on horizontally partitioned data. It's set that the 
(i 6 = j;1 6 i; j 6 h) 1 6 i; j 6 h). They want to jointly conduct count aggregate query on the union of all their private data sets without disclosing any private data to anybody else including other participators.
To find out the result of count aggregate query on the global 
Two-Round Secure Sum Protocol
The goal of Two-Round Secure Sum Protocol (denoted as TSSP) is to deal with the following problem that h h (h > 3) (h > 3) individual clients C 1 ; C 2 ; :::; C h C 1 ; C 2 ; :::; C h hold secret private numbers n 1 ; n 2 ; :::; n h n 1 ; n 2 ; :::; n h separately and they intend to find out the sum
party obtains nothing about other client's private information.
. . 
Highlight of TSSP:
In the protocol, there are two rounds to securely compute the sum. In the first round, each client obtains a secret random digit to obscure his private number. They alter the order of transmitting messages in the second round to reduce the information loss caused by underlying collusion and the sum will safely be found out after the second round. In the first round, C 1 C 1 randomly generates a key pair (pk 1 ; sk 1 ) (pk 1 ; sk 1 ) of Pallier's homomorphic cryptosystem (see section 2.2) and a large integer m num m num which is much greater than the total number of records in the table S S . Then C 1 C 1 sends C 2 C 2 the encryption of a random natural number r r; C 2 C 2 randomly selects a private numeric parameter r 2 r 2 which will be used to mask its confidential number n 2 n 2 in the second round and computes E pk 1 (r + r 2 ) = E pk 1 (r) £ E pk 1 (r 2 ) E pk 1 (r + r 2 ) = E pk 1 (r) £ E pk 1 (r 2 ) which is sent to C 3 C 3 . C h C h recursively obtains E pk 1 (r + P h k=2 r i ) E pk 1 (r + P h k=2 r i ) along the ring illustrated in Figure 5 (a) and sends it to C 1 C 1 . At last, C 1 C 1 decrypts E pk 1 (r + P h k=2 r i ) E pk 1 (r + P h k=2 r i ) and sets
such that 0´( P h k=1 r i )(mod m num) 0´( P h k=1 r i )(mod m num) holds. Therefore, each client retains a random integer which is called digital envelope in [14] to hide its private number, the return value of local sub-query, in the next round. Assume g g and f f are respectively the maximal odd integer and the largest even number in the closed interval [ 
C 2 generates another key pair (pk 2 ; sk 2 ) (pk 2 ; sk 2 ) of homomorphic encryption system in the second round. Then, they implement the following circle where the Start / Termination order of transmitting messages is demonstrated in Figure  5 (b). C 2 C 2 encrypts s + r 2 + n 2 s + r 2 + n 2 where s s is a random integral value selected and held by C 2 C 2 and transmits E pk 2 (s + r 2 + n 2 ) E pk 2 (s + r 2 + n 2 ) to its immediate successor C 4 C 4 ; then C 4 C 4 computes E pk 2 (s + r 2 + r 4 + n 2 + n 4 ) E pk 2 (s + r 2 + r 4 + n 2 + n 4 ) = E pk 2 (s + r 2 + n 2 ) £ E pk 2 (r 4 + n 4 ) = E pk 2 (s + r 2 + n 2 ) £ E pk 2 (r 4 + n 4 ) and sends it to C 6 C 6 . It is repeated on the ring shown in Figure 5 
Finally, C 2 C 2 decrypts it, then obtains P h i=1 n i P h i=1 n i by subtracting the extra value s s and modulo m num m num and broadcasts the exact sum. The Correctness Analysis of TSSP: To explain the equation sum = P h t=1 n t sum = P h t=1 n t is correct, the proof is displayed as below.
In the step 5 of TSSP, it is quite clear that y i = E pk 2 (s + n 2 + n 4 + ::: + n i + r 2 + r 4 + ::: + r i ) y i = E pk 2 (s + n 2 + n 4 + ::: + n i + r 2 + r 4 + ::: + r i ).
Therefore,
(mod m num).
In the step 4 of TSSP,
´r (mod m num).
Since
r t´0 (mod m num).
Therefore, sum = P h t=1 n t sum = P h t=1 n t holds while every client correctly obeys the protocol. The Security Analysis of TSSP: When each client is semi-honest, that is, they strictly follow the protocol and no clients collude, a single client can't find out any other client's private data since each number is masked and messages in the first round and second round are encrypted by different public key. We present the security analysis of TSSP while potential collusion occurs in the sub-section below. In the process of TSSP, 
and keeps r 1 r 1 secret.
//Second Round
Step5: C 2 C 2 generates another public and private key pair (pk 2 ; sk 2 ) (pk 2 ; sk 2 ) of Pallier's homomorphic encryption scheme and sends public key pk 2 pk 2 to other parties. Then he selects a secret random parameter s s and sets y 0 = E pk 2 (s) y 0 = E pk 2 (s). //initialize y 0 y 0 for i = 2; 4; :::; f ¡ 2 for i = 2; 4; :
Step7: for i = 1; 3; 5; :::; g ¡ 2 for i = 1; 3; 5; ::
t=1 n t (mod m num) and broadcasts sum sum to C 1 ; C 3 ; C 4 ; :::; C h C 1 ; C 3 ; C 4 ; :::; C h . strong capability of prevent the disclosure of privacy. For one thing, it's hard to persuade 4 to 6 coconspirators because of high cost and high risk; for another, a malicious client can't learn other clients' private data while C 1 C 1 or C 2 C 2 does not collude with C j C j . Besides, we can adopt measures below in the real world to implicitly preclude collusion.
(A) Set two adversaries as C 1 C 1 and C 2 C 2 respectively, such that they will not be corrupted simultaneously.
(B) Let a client with high credibility be C 1 C 1 or C 2 C 2 , then he holds high loyalty to refuse collusion with any corrupted party.
(C) Breaking rules and losing reputation will be severely punished, which will hold back potential collusion to a great extent. Figure 6 indicates that the average number of clients needed to collude with in order to slinkingly infer the private data of C i C i increases with the total number of clients and nearly runs up to 8 8 when the total number of clients is larger than 20 20; the lower bound of number of clients needed to collude with is 4 4 (while the total clients are more than 5 5 clients) or h ¡ 1 h ¡ 1 (when there are h h (h = 3; 4) (h = 3; 4) clients in total). Therefore, TSSP, which increases level of difficulty to collude, can effectively reduce the risk from potential collusion.
According to the above fact, our protocol TSSP is quite secure to against underlying collusion. Thus, it has stronger security than the semi-honest assumption [3] . Figure 1, According to the above-mentioned, our method of dealing with privacy-preserving count aggregate query on heterogeneous data is illustrated as following. 
is the exact count of rows of the table S S which satisfy the global selecting condition P 1 and P 2 and ::: and P c P 1 and P 2 and ::: and P c . Therefore, u ¡ v u ¡ v , equal to a ¢ b a ¢ b , is the accurate answer to count aggregate query on the table S S when each party exactly follows the steps. That is, the scheme for privacy-preserving count aggregate query of OLAP over heterogeneous data is correct and it is able to return the accurate result rather than the exact value's maximum likelihood estimator in [1] . The Security Analysis: The novel scheme is secure if and only if each participant's privacy will be well preserved and no one can find out other party's confidential information.
Since scalar product protocol [5] we employ is secure based on the security of Paillier's homomorphic encryption scheme [17] , therefore, the private data of neither of participants will be disclosed and our approach to privacy-preserving count aggregate query on vertically partitioned data is secure. The Complexity Analysis: The communication overhead of the above scheme is about nb 0 nb 0 where b 0 b 0 is the bit length of an encrypted item and the computation cost in the cooperative computation is less than 7n 7n.
To sum up, it is clear that the novel scheme for privacy-preserving count aggregate query of OLAP over vertically partitioned data will return accurate result based on scalar product protocol [5] , which is superior to the exact value's maximum likelihood estimator in [1] . Besides, the foregoing analysis of complexity shows our new scheme is efficient in computation cost and communication overheads.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In the paper, we have proposed a new model based on SMC protocols for PPOLAP. According to the new model, we put forward approaches to privacy preserving count aggregate query of OLAP over both horizontally partitioned data and vertically partitioned data. Additionally, we proved the security and correctness by theoretical analysis and we also analyzed communication overheads and computation complexity of our methods. No privacy loss and exact accuracy are two main advantages of our schemes.
For the future work, we will develop other privacy preserving aggregate operations except count according to the PPOLAP model based on SMC protocols.
